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A nonparametric measure of riskness in
financial systems
Una misura nonparametrica di rischiosita` nei sistemi
finanziari
Francesca Parpinel and Claudio Pizzi
Abstract In the literature of risk analysis different synthetic indices are artificially
built and in this work we propose to use the combination statistical procedure of the
univariate indices proposed by V-lab. The combination technique may also be con-
sidered to perform nonparametric inference. So we propose to highlight systemic
risk in a network of companies performing a nonparametric test to reveal hetero-
geneity behaviour; in this case one ranking is used to create different behavioural
groups.
Abstract In letteratura le diverse misure sintetiche di rischio sono costruite artifi-
ciosamente e in questo lavoro ne indichiamo uno che si basa su una procedura di
combinazione statistica di indici univariati che sono proposti dalla piattaforma V-
lab. La tecnica di combinazione puo` essere usata anche per procedure inferenziali
nonparametriche. Con tale strumento si puo` evidenziare il rischio sistemico di una
rete di compagnie, usando un test non parametrico per rivelare comportamenti di
eterogeneita`; qui l’ordinamento si usa per creare i diversi gruppi.
Key words: Systemic risk, ranking, nonparametric combination.
1 Introduction
The recent Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 is defined by some economists as “the
worst crisis after the Great Depression of the thirties”, highlighting the need of new
definitions and measures of the risk associated both to the financial system and to its
institutions. The history of risk definition and importance of measuring it are very
old going back to the days of ancient Greece, but nowadays this need is increas-
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ingly pressing (see [1]). Roughly speaking, the term risk may refer to two different
”dimensions”; in fact, considering the institutions–level, it is a measure of some
peculiar aspects of their riskiness whereas if we consider the system–level, it is a
measure capturing the depth and the breadth of the networks linking the financial
institutions. In this last case we call it systemic risk and in literature we find many
different definitions of it, with consequently several measurement procedure. For
example in [6], it is considered as the possibility that an insolvent financial Insti-
tution may transferred its insolvency to the whole financial system and in [3] the
systemic risk is represented by network diagrams depending on Granger causality
index for each institution. Other peculiar definitions compare it to Nessie, the Loch
Ness Monster (see [2]), as everyone knows it but nobody knows when and where
it might strike. Other authors (see[5]) consider the risk coming from some unusual
event with strong correlations among different assets. Kaufman states that it is the
consequence of a series of losses moving within a network of markets or institutions
(see [8]). Further definitions can be found in literature. The importance of defining,
and then measuring, systemic risk is really strong as financial surveillance is nowa-
days necessary for the governments policies of various contries (see [7]).
In the present work we highlight the relations of the individual institutions,
proposing an index linking several variables that characterize each financial insti-
tutions, with the aim of ranking the companies in the network by riskiness. At first,
the ranking obtained by this index will be compared with the ranking induced by the
systemic risk measure proposed by V-Lab1, the platform of the NYU Stern School
of Business. The risk measure computed by V-Lab estimates the amount of recap-
italization necessary to a company not to fail in a financial crisis, while the index
proposed in this work estimates the effective level risk at a specific time. The com-
parison lets us to find analogies and differences in the two rankings constructed with
real data, and leads us to propose some new risk measures.
2 Nonparametric combination of dependent rankings
As pointed out in the previous section, the number of variables involved in the mea-
suring process may be high. The idea is to reduce high dimensionality in order to
create only one dimension and to treat easily ranking among institutions.To this
goal we may use several statistical tools. For example we may consider the rank-
ing obtained by principal component analysis. With this tecnique, in a Gaussian
framework, it is possible to reduce the number of variables keeping as much as pos-
sible the variability structure, represented by the covariance matrix, through a linear
combination of them (see [11]). In such a way, if the first components were able to
get most of the data variability, we could consider only them as representative of
the whole system. One of the bounds in this technique is linked with the Gaussian
1 Volatility Laboratory, {http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/ }
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assumption, as all the multivariate variability is represented only by the variance
matrix.
Here we propose to use, in alternative to a linear combination of statistical mea-
sures, a nonparametric one based on the rankings of such measures, according to
Pesarin’s work (see [10]), as it is satisfactory even when the rankings may be depen-
dent. Each risk measure can capture only some feature of risk and of systemic risk
too, so our idea is to use all the available variables giving some partial, even over-
lapping, information about it. Let’s suppose to measure K > 1 random variables,
denoted by (X1, . . . ,Xk, . . . ,XK) and to transform them in some variables denoted by
λk, k = 1 . . . ,K each defined over (0,1). The combination function ψ of these new
variables λk may depend on some weights, denoted by (w1, . . . ,wK), according to
the importance of each variable and produce a new variable Y through a function
ψ : R2K→ R1. Following [9], the idea of combining different statistical indices, typ-
ically dependent on each other, arises from the same procedure for combination of
dependent tests in multivariate analysis (see [10]). In the inferential case the com-
bining functions are applied to p-values associated to marginal tests and is tipically
a nonparametric one. We must underline that this procedure doesn’t explicitly in-
volve the whole time series.As well described in [10], the combination function ψ
has to satisfy some minimal properties, that are continuity in all its arguments, non-
decreasing in each λk, symmetry, i.e. invariant with respect to rearrangements of the
variables λk, its supremum, ψ¯ , is attained when even one value of λk tends to zero,
the value of ψ is strictly less than ψ¯ .
In our work we will use the Fisher combination function
ψ =−
K
∑
k=1
wk · log(1−λk). (1)
In literature other important combining functions, all satisfying the above proper-
ties have been proposed, for example: the Tippett one, where ψT = maxk(wk ·λk);
Normal one, in which ψN = ∑Kk=1 wk ·Φ−1(λk), and the Logistic one, with ψl =
∑Kk=1 wk · log[λk/(1−λk)].
3 A further index to measure risk
In the literature, there are a lot of different measures to evaluate risk in a company,
that are often used in comparisons; but, why do we compare these indices? We
propose to use all of them in order to get a more complete information about risk and
the obtained results will be compared with the ranking estimated by V-Lab in order
to evaluate the correspondences and the main differences for European Banks. With
this aims we use the variables described in the following and summarized in Table
1 and we embed them in our framework to compute Y = ψ1(·), by (1). First of all
X1 is Marginal Expected Shortfall denoting the expected loss (per dollar invested in
capital) in which a company would occur with a fall market equal to 2%. Variable X2
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Table 1 The involved variables
Variable Description
X1 MES: Marginal Expected Shortfall
X2 Beta: slope between firm’s stock return and market returns
X3 Correlation: between share return and Market Value Weighted Index
X4 Volatility: The annualized volatility of company share capital
X5 Leverage: Indebtness
X6 SRISK: the systemic risk measure indicated by VLab
is Beta that is the covariance between a firm’s stock return and the market, divided
by the variance of market returns; in our case, it explains the correlation between
the Eurostoxx50 and the main equity security of each institution. The Correlation
between the share return and the Market Value Weighted Index, representing the
movement of the market in which changes in the price of the various stocks lead
to the final value of the index in proportion to its value of market capitalization, is
denoted by X3. Variable X4 is the Volatility, measured by the annualized standard
deviation of returns based on daily returns. At last we consider X5 the indebtedness,
Leverage. The new index is compared to SRISK, see [4], that is the measure of
systemic risk of each institution over the global European risk, and here denoted
with X6; it is an estimate of the amount of recapitalization that a company needs not
to fail in a financial crisis.
At last we propose to use the combination only for the variables characterizing
each institution, X1, X2 and X3, but not explicitely their riskiness, instead represented
by X4 and X5, calling the combined variable as Combined Index 3. So two or more
groups of companies may be identified using quantiles of the obtained Combined
Index 3. Then, on these groups we test the combination of X4, X5 and X6 following
a permutation procedure proposed by [10].
3.1 Case study
The dataset is composed by a set of N = 103 financial institutions for which we
observe the variables described in Section 3 and that we can get from VLAB, (data
recorded in March, 2014). The Spearman correlation matrix, showed in Table 2 and
the tests performed on each pair of variables show the cases in which we can reject
the hypothesis of null correlation. We can note that in most cases the correlations
are significative (here we don’t consider any adjustment for multiple tests). Only
variable Volatility may be considered incorrelated to the other ones, in particular
Correlation, Leverage and SRISK.. This correlation structure explains the weak de-
pendence among the considered variables, and it is positive as we may use all of
them in order to gain a better comprehension of the phenomena. To compute the
combined index, first of all, the institution are ranked in increasing order with re-
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Table 2 Correlations and significativities (*) at α = 0.01
MES Beta Correlation Volatility Leverage
Beta 0.9991(*) - - - -
Cor 0.7084(*) 0.7100(*) - - -
Vol 0.3734(*) 0.3739(*) -0.1777 - -
Lvg -0.2923(*) -0.2879(*) -0.3663(*) 0.1219 -
SRISK. 0.3803(*) 0.3837(*) 0.4058(*) 0.0934 0.4865(*)
spect to each variable, then, such ranks are transformed in sample percentiles called
ηk, k = 1, . . . ,K.
Let Xki denote the value of k-th variable, with k = 1, . . . ,K, on unit i, with i =
1, . . . ,N. Function I(A) is 1 if A is true and zero otherwise. Then for each variable
Xk we consider the following transformation
ηki =
∑Nj=1 I(Xki ≥ Xk j)+0.5
N+1
(2)
where values 0.5 and 1 assure the absence of 0 and 1, for variable ηk, and so we
avoid the not finiteness problems of combination function. In such a way, we obtain
a K×N matrix for values ηki. As each column of the matrix, ordered in decreasing
way, are the partial rankings, the global one is gained applying the Fisher combina-
tion function to each row, with wk = 1, ψi =−∑Kk=1 log(1−ηki). Some comparisons
in term of correlations of the rankings induced by SRISK, by the combined index
including X1, X2, X3, X4, X5 and called Combined.1, by the combined index includ-
ing X1, X2, X3, X4, X5 and X6 and called Combined.2, and by the first component
produced by PCA) show that the correlations are not too strong but they are signi-
ficatively different from zero. This confirms the idea that the problem is a complex
one and cannot be reduced to only one variable.
4 To define a new measure of riskiness
The same combination strategy may be used to identify and test the heterogeneity
of a set of data, considering a permutation tests for complex data. To this aim we
can think to distinguish 2 groups of institutions created considering the combination
only for the variables characterizing each institution, that is X1, X2 and X3, defined
as Combined Index 3, and considering the third quartile, Q3 as the element to divide
the data in two subsets. The summary statistics of this new index are reported in
Table 3.
The variables, that are more explicitly explaining risk, may be represented by X4,
X5 and X6. So two, or in general even more than two, groups of companies may be
identified using the quartiles of variable Combined Index 3. In our case the size of
dataset is 103, so we can consider two groups separated by the third quartile, equal
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Table 3 Summary statistics of Combined Index 3
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.12 0.91 1.88 2.01 2.81 5.41
to 2.807, one of size 77, the other one of size 26. Then, on these groups we test
the combination of X4, X5 and X6 following the permutation procedure proposed by
[10]. We consider the difference of the sample coefficients of variability computed
in each groups as statistic test: s = cv1− cv2 where cvi is the ratio of the sample
standard deviation to the sample mean for i = 1,2. The combining function we use
is the Fisher omnibus defined by (1) and the hypothesis system is{
H0 : CV1 =CV2
H1 : CV1 6=CV2
If the data leads us to accept the null hypothesis, that means that the two groups are
very similar in term of behaviour, so we may suggest that the two group are similar
and that the riskiness is high for this network of institutions. Otherwise we refuse
the idea of high risk.
With the available dataset, the Non Parametric Combination method is performed
over B = 1000 randomized permutation of the two groups, and we find that the p-
value associated to the observation is 0.23776. This value does not allow to reject the
hypothesis of high risk for this network of institutions to significance level α = 0.05.
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